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Today’s age of the Internet has birthed many new environments that have become societies all
themselves under the label “social networks.” The Internet provides interaction that varies from
electronic text messages to videos, pictures, and even electronic “hugs” between users. Although
these sites are fairly new, the social relations among users portrays behavior which is the subject
of theorist and philosopher Michel Foucault, who published many works in the 1970s, such as
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and “The History of Sexuality.” These pieces are
considered groundbreaking and foundational, as they examine the interrelated ideas of discourse,
power, and the subject. Foucault focuses on the how and why people write, say, and think about
certain objects of study; what powers shape people and how; and what the self becomes once it is
shaped by governing powers. While Foucault focuses his work on institutions, such as the clinic,
the prison, or the school, it is possible to see these same devices at work in a much more
seemingly innocuous environment: social networks, more specifically, Facebook. This
interactive Internet site, which has attracted millions of users across the globe, has become a
technique of power or a productive device in the relationships between people and society that is
in constant change, and this power has the ability to produce who people are and how they see
themselves (Barker 10). While Foucault’s ideas were published decades ago, the concepts he
describes in his literature are working in a new social environment. Facebook allows the
pleasures of analysis and scrutiny to continue, allowing people to become docile subjects or
identities that are shaped by the ever-changing discourses or ideas and statements which
surround them.

It is important to understand the bedrock of Foucault’s ideas in order to grasp how Facebook
qualifies as a technique of power. In Michel Foucault: An Introduction, discourse is described as
individual acts of language or ideas and statements, which allow people to make sense of and see
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things; power is said to be an intangible and productive concept, which is really a set of
relationships between groups and societies which is constantly changing with time; and the
subject is the identity as a product of discourses, which means that the self is not created by the
self, but it is created by external ideas, statements, or discourses (Barker 10-14). Alec McHoul
and Wendy Grace describe how Foucault sees discourse as a relationship between “bodies of
knowledge” or groups of statements and ideas and forms of social control (26). In other words,
knowledge is necessary to exercise power. Discourse must take into account the historical
context which enables or prohibits writing, speaking, and even thinking about certain ideas
(McHoul and Grace 31). In fact, for Foucault, the “statement” is not just a grammatical or
linguistic utterance; it has socio-historical value and meaning (40). Understanding discourse in
this way has profound effects on how “human subjects are formed, how institutions attempt to
‘normalise’ persons on the margins of social life, how historical conditions of knowledge change
and vary” (41). Certainly, this has relevance to the idea of Facebook being a type of discourse;
after all, it is a creation of the Internet age, a revolutionary part of the world’s history and a social
environment that is fairly new.

If discourse is truly ideas and statements which allow people to understand themselves and
concepts more fully, then Facebook certainly fits this definition; users share their status or what
they are doing or thinking; they are able to write notes about any subject they desire; users are
able to post pictures and messages to other users, etc. All of this discourse is viewable to
“friends” who gather these messages and are able to make responses. Expounding on McHoul
and Grace’s statement about how discourse can form “human subjects,” it is important to
recognize Facebook as a real type of discourse; this social networking site has allowed various
forms of communication to be sent instantly and in mass quantities. Never before has someone
had so many connections at one time, making “bodies of knowledge” accessible instantly to
many. This, of course, has profound implications. For example, this mass of communication that
is available certainly begins to shape the users who utilize it day after day, and also impacts how
people say what they say; a user is able to use photos, words, images, video, and web links to
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express themselves, something that is perhaps not available in a true face-to-face interaction with
another human.

These varying interactions help create dynamic relationships among users, which portray
Foucault’s perception of power, and for Foucault, power and sexuality are interrelated concepts.
Foucault describes how sex has become something to be studied and scrutinized, thus making
Western civilization look at sex as a scientia sexualis, or a science of sexuality. Foucault explains
that the true benefit from, and reason for, confession for both subject and observer lies with
“spirals of power and pleasure” (“The History of Sexuality” 897). The observer exercises power
by analyzing the subject’s sexual life and drawing out the sexual tidbits of the subject’s life,
which gives the observer pleasure. Foucault describes that there is “pleasure that comes of
exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out” (897). The subject
experiences pleasure by having his sexual pleasures focused on, and his sexual behavior is
encouraged or “power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or resisting”
(897). In this case, a Facebook user who receives many comments about their sexually charged
photos they just displayed receives pleasure from having their sexual acts commented on, and the
observers receive pleasure from their sense of power of having their comments replied to; thus, a
spiral is created of power and pleasure, pursuing one another in a circular pattern.

In order to further understand Foucault’s ideas of power and sexuality, it is important to grasp
the concept of the technique of power that is the “confessional.” In “The History of Sexuality,”
Foucault focuses on sexual discourse throughout history and uncovers why sexuality is
discussed, studied, examined, and investigated, and he refutes that sexuality has been silenced.
Through medicine, psychiatry, and even the church, sexual secrets have been confessed and put
under the proverbial microscope to find out who people really are. According to the “repressive
hypothesis,” which Foucault refutes, the act of confessing is seen as liberating, freeing, and
therapeutic. “Confessional” may very well be the literal confessional found in a Roman Catholic
Church, but it “can take the form of interrogations, interviews, conversations, consultations, or
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even autobiographical narratives” (McHoul and Grace 80).

Social networking sites, such as Facebook, allow people to broadcast, or confess, intimate
aspects of their lives, including issues regarding sexuality. Relationship status, public comments
to other users and even sending “hugs” and “kisses” for many other “friends” to observe fill the
need that Foucault describes regarding confession. Of course, using Facebook is a choice, and
people choose what aspects of themselves to divulge or conceal. It may be unclear why people
desire to reveal such intimate details about themselves on these semi-public/public sites, but
according to Foucault’s ideas, Western civilization fixates on sex as a science, and since the
Middle Age, confessions about sex have become increasingly important to understand the
identity and soul of a person (Danaher, Schirato, and Webb 142). Foucault explains how the
“repressive hypothesis” declares confessions to be commonly thought of as freeing and helpful
to our mental and psychological health (41). In other words, the only way to break free from
sexual repression is to talk, confess, reveal, and divulge these sexual secrets. Foucault asserts that
the benefits of confession are not a proven fact, but instead, this idea is only a construct of our
culture (129). People have been pushed to see confession as a helpful act because those who
desire confessions have thrust this upon them.

The confessional is a concept which incites voluntarily divulging information to an observer,
or one who monitors. However, McHoul and Grace describe how Foucault examines instances
where observation and monitoring can take on an entirely different look than a confessional (67).
For example, the observed has no knowledge who or what is observing, or the one confessing
does not know whether one can hear them or not (67). Foucault uncovers how watching,
studying, observing and surveying are all concepts of power (67). So, it is crucial to take into
account Foucault’s thoughts regarding “disciplinary power” and “surveillance;” for, they are also
alive and well in this social networking site.

Foucault consistently observes how power and knowledge have evolved and changed in
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relation to their historicity, and one observation is how the techniques of power have changed to
suit a modern world (67). An example Foucault uses is the “Panopticon,” a surveillance system
used in modern prisons that allows a mass amount of prisoners to be monitored at once (67).
Through the use of the Panopticon, power is not exercised through physical threats of death,
rather this modern technique “relies on ‘surveillance’ and the internal training this produces to
incite states of docility” (67). In other words, the observed are taught how to behave, not
necessarily through consequences of physical punishment if one is caught misbehaving, but
simply through the guarantee of continually monitoring all behavior. Additionally, prisoners do
not even have to be certain that someone is in the device watching; the very presence of the
device prompts the desired reaction from the inmates.

A Facebook user has the guarantee, much like an inmate in a prison, of the possibility of
constant surveillance by the observer(s), which regulates behavior. Interestingly, many Facebook
users may desire this policing and regulation because of the desire to confess and divulge
information. In the article “Does Facebook Replace Face Time or Enhance It?”, Lisa Selin Davis
said, “It’s still surprising to me, however, this combination of Orwell and WALL-E that has
humans watching one another through computer screens and socializing in quasi-isolation.” She
continues by quoting from a Facebook user describing her online “friends,” “‘I know more about
them now than I did when I was in regular contact with them’”(Davis). Photos, messages,
activities, and statuses are able to be monitored by others. A user is reminded of this before they
decide to post a photo that may show them in a compromising situation, or reply to a “friend”
with a message that could incite an unwanted reaction from other users.

Very much like the atmosphere of a prison which utilizes the Panopticon, in 2006, Facebook
added the standard feature of “News Feed,” which is viewable every time a user logs on to the
network. “News Feed” contains every action of every single “friend” since a user last visited the
site. This list of news had many Facebook users outraged and was seen as an invasion of privacy;
a petition was even started to eliminate the feature altogether. In the article “Inside the Backlash
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Against Facebook,” a user describes, “‘Every action I take on Facebook is now time stamped .
… It’s a little strange because everyone will now know that at 10 o’clock I updated my Facebook
profile and that I wasn’t in class’” (Shmidt). In the article “Misuse of Networking Sites ‘Could
Cost You Your Job,’” public health workers are warned that sharing questionable information
and photos, even from a home computer, may be cause for termination. One Facebook user
describes her reason for using the social networking site in the article, “Facebook Wants to Read
Your Mind” by Claire Suddath. She explains, “‘I like a quick and dirty read-through of what
people are doing.’” It is obvious that Facebook users feel watched, but they also enjoy the ability
to watch others. Never before has the Panopticon been operated by the very people that are also
being observed. This type of constant monitoring will lead a user to begin to self-censor. Much
like a prisoner regulates his own behavior because the technological eyes are watching, a
Facebook user is very much aware of the eyes behind the computer screen.

It is clear how Facebook is an example of Foucault’s description of disciplinary power. In his
article “Panopticism,” Foucault establishes the criteria that disciplinary power must fulfill,
including “to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low
expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative
invisibility, the little resistance it arouses” (207). Certainly Facebook fits this. The cost of joining
Facebook is absolutely free for the user, and politically, Facebook has become so discreet in that
it has voluntarily infiltrated the homes of millions of people across the globe. In short, it has
become a part of people’s daily lives. While there has been some backlash to the surveillance
applications which Facebook uses, it is small: A mere twenty-eight thousand users have voiced
concern compared to the 2 million who use the site (Schmidt). Foucault continues with another
aspect disciplinary power: “to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity
and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval” (“Panopticism” 207).
Facebook has a motto that shows its connection to this idea: “Facebook helps you connect and
share with the people in your life,” and the image on the website shows blank faces spread over a
world map, each connected to one another. Needless to say, millions of people are using this site,
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publicly sharing their lives with one another. Foucault also said that disciplinary power increases
“both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system” (207). It is certainly easy to
control someone who voluntarily gives themselves up to a power, and in this case, the power is
Facebook. Users comply with the surveillance on their own accord, perhaps unknown to the
effects of their behavior being regulated.

Viewing several Facebook profiles may lead one to conclude that behavior is not being
regulated at all, and “disciplinary power” is not in Facebook, but this is not the case. Despite the
uniform layout of profiles for every user, the uniqueness of the individual is evident. Perhaps this
is why users are enthralled with Facebook in the first place: A person’s unique life unfolds
before those allowed to see it. People seem distinct and unlike the next “friend” on a user’s list
because of various “applications” that are available for the users, the uniqueness of photos,
personal statuses, “notes,” etc. McHoul and Grace expound on how this relates to Foucault’s
ideas of how power regulates and normalizes behavior (72). For Foucault, disciplinary power,
such as the Panopticon, or in this case Facebook, produces individuals because it causes the
observer to seek out the non-normal behavior: “differences, peculiarities, deviance and
eccentricities are ever more highlighted in a system of controls concerned to seek them out”
(McHoul and Grace 72). In fact, McHoul and Grace describe how Foucault asserts that
personality is a product of disciplinary power: “[A]s power becomes more anonymous and more
functional, those upon whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized” (72). In
other words, the close scrutiny of policing produces individuality.

Obviously, discourse and power are at work in Facebook, and for Foucault, those two
components work together to create the “subject.” This would mean that the self is not a product
of consciousness or self creativity, but rather a product of the powers and discourses that
discipline them, an idea that Foucault asserts in his early work (Danaher, Schirato and Webb
116). Barker describes this thoroughly: “The soul which in our epoch provides the lodging for
freedom and humanism is already the effect of power and subjection. A certain substantive form
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of existence comes into being as a consequence of practices of domination and subjection”
(50-51). In other words, human souls and bodies are molded into subjects by the powers that
surround them.

Additionally, once the body is subjected, it is now an “object” of scrutiny for whatever field
the observer desires. For example, “the juridical and penal systems serve as exemplars for the
possibility of transforming and subjecting bodies and constituting them as objects of different
kind of knowledges: scientific, juridical, philosophical, political and so on” (Barker 51). Barker
comments how Foucault describes that the nature of subjection was almost always brutal,
physically violent, public and torturous in earlier times (51). The subjected bore the scars of the
physical beatings that demanded a confession, for example. Foucault asserts that through time,
methods of subjection became less physically violent and more an issue of widespread
surveillance, for example, the emergence of the Panopticon, security and traffic cameras, etc.
(“Panopticism” 259). Obviously, this relates to the present Internet age and the utilization of
Facebook and how this constant surveillance creates “self-subjecting” users (Barker 62). If the
self is only an entity created by outside powers and discourses, then Danaher, Schirato, and
Webb describe that the “subject can’t pre-exist the social order, or be the source of meaning”
(122). A subject changes in relation to what context they find themselves. So a Facebook user
may provide a type of themselves on their profile that may not be who they are most of the time
in the context of their home.

Danaher, Schirato, and Webb expound on Foucault’s ideas by describing the transformations
which people undergo in relation to their surroundings: “[P]eople do not have natural and
unchanging characteristics. Rather, we are produced out of a network of discourses, institutions
and relations, and always liable to change according to the circumstances” (123). A “subject” is
then a slippery and fluid entity that reacts to its contextual powers and discourses. This idea leads
to Foucault’s declaration of the “death of the subject,” or the thought that humans are being
erased because it is created by external rather than intrinsic qualities, making it unstable,

Journal of South Texas English
Studies
Fall 2009
changing, and unreliable. Danaher, Schirato, and Webb provide insight of how this relates to
Facebook: “[I]n our contemporary world most of us are artificial because … we are connected to
machines for most of the time (computers, for instance)” (123). With this in mind, it is easy to
understand Facebook as a discourse, or a group of statements and ideas that change with time,
and how Facebook creates subjects, or identities that are products of discourses.

In addition, Foucault describes how the self attempts to achieve subjectivity through what he
describes as “technologies of the self,” one of which is “self-knowledge” or knowing the self
(129). This idea, which is predominately Western, encompasses self-evaluation through
verbalization or writing, for example, keeping a journal. Those in power use these ideas to create
subjects that would be better for society as a whole, the premise being people who self-evaluate
will be better citizens, leading to a better society (130). Interestingly, Facebook recently changed
their status question from “what are you doing right now?” to “what is on your mind?”
(Suddath). This question certainly prompts the user to dig a little deeper into their consciousness
and perhaps evaluate themselves. Of course, the idea of Facebook is a chance for users to create
a page all about themselves or “the self.” Viewing a profile page provides a user with this
self-knowledge that Foucault describes in creating subjects.

Through understanding Foucault’s ideas concerning discourse, power, and subjects, it is quite
clear that Facebook is a modern technique of power that is in use in today’s Internet age. Users
are both the observer and the observed, and they receive both power and pleasure through their
surveillance of one another. Interestingly, Foucault emphasizes the importance of looking at
discourse as inextricably linked to history; the era produces what type of communication is
acceptable or prohibited. This idea is appropriate in terms of looking at the Internet age
producing a type of discourse: Facebook.
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